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Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to report on a human factors evaluation 
of ground control station design concepts for interacting with an unmanned traf-
fic management system. The data collected for this paper comes from recent 
field tests for NASA's Unmanned Traffic Management (UTM) project, and co-
vers the following topics; workload, situation awareness, as well as flight crew 
communication, coordination, and procedures. The goal of this evaluation was 
to determine if the various software implementations for interacting with the 
UTM system can be described and classified into design concepts to provide 
guidance for the development of future UTM interfaces. We begin with a brief 
description of NASA's UTM project, followed by a description of the test range 
configuration related to a second development phase. We  identified (post hoc) 
two classes in which the ground control stations could be grouped. This group-
ing was based on level of display integration. The analysis was exploratory and 
informal. It was conducted to compare ground stations across those two classes 
and against the aforementioned topics. Herein, we discuss the results. 
Keywords: Unmanned Traffic Management · Human-systems Integration · 
Systems Engineering · Human Factors 
1 Introduction 
Unmanned aircraft, commonly referred to as "drones", are aircraft designed to operate 
with the absence of an onboard pilot. These aircraft may be part of an unmanned air-
craft system (UAS) that allows a pilot to manually control the vehicle remotely, or 
provide strategic guidance when the aircraft is autonomous. To name a few, UAS 
have applications in search and rescue, infrastructure inspections, goods delivery, 
recreation, and media. Due in part to the diversity of such applications and their rela-
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tive affordability, the market for UAS is expected to grow significantly. The Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) has projected that sales of UAS of all sizes and types 
in the United States will grow from 2.5 million in 2016 to 7 million units in 2020 [1]. 
If these aircraft are eventually deployed, the total number of concurrent UAS opera-
tions in the U.S. is expected to be up to 250,000 by 2035 - approximately 175,000 of 
those will be for commerce alone [2]. 
 
Early experience from manned aviation has made the case for an appropriate level of 
organization, if safety is to be achieved with increasingly congested air traffic [3]. 
This meant that the air traffic had to be managed. For manned air-traffic, this is done 
through a system where human controllers are responsible for maintaining separation 
between aircraft. This system has proven to be very safe. The disadvantage is that the 
capacity of the airspace will be limited by human cognitive resources - mainly work-
load. NASA studies, e.g. [4], conducted to examine solutions for meeting growing 
demand for air transportation services found that sustained high capacity is achievable 
if automation assisted controllers in separating aircraft. We expect these findings to 
remain relevant to UAS operations. However, a system for managing UAS operations 
will need to consider accommodating an unmanned aircraft fleet size that is forecast 
to be 35 times that of manned aircraft in 2020. Given these considerations, NASA's 
vision for UAS Traffic Management (UTM) will not mirror the traditional manned air 
traffic management system. Instead, UTM will be designed to allocate active man-
agement of aircraft from human controllers to automation. Humans in this system will 
then serve as supervisors providing strategic level input  [3]. Beyond the U.S., the 
European aviation community has also recognized the importance of UTM, and 
acknowledged that rising demand for UAS operations could be addressed by UTM 
and related technologies. NASA's UTM concept of operations offers initial guidance 
for testing such technologies.  
 
According to the NASA UTM concept of operations, the UTM will be designed to 
safely enable large-scale small UAS (i.e., unmanned aircraft less than 50 pounds) 
operations in low altitude (i.e., below 500 feet) Class G airspace [3]. This will be 
achieved by providing technical capabilities to UAS operators and stakeholders. 
Technical capabilities will take the form of information products and services. These 
products and services will be tested as part of the UTM concept in NASA's research 
platform [5, 6]. The research platform supports research with both live and simulated 
aircraft. The simulation capabilities have enabled the testing of off-nominal interac-
tions between virtual and live aircraft in field tests, and it will be the primary tool for 
feasibly evaluating large scale UAS operations as the tests grow in complexity. This 
increasing complexity, as well as scope, is reflected in NASA's plan for testing the 
UTM concept - distinguished by four technical capability levels (TCL). TCL 1 and 2 
have already been tested.  
 
In TCL 1, operations were conducted over remotely populated areas (e.g., rural opera-
tions) [7]. The traffic density was very low, with 4 aircraft available in early field tests 
and at most 2 concurrent operations; each in its own volume that reserved all airspace 
above and below. The aircraft remained within visual line of sight throughout the 
operation. The UTM services provided only vetting of operations against conflicts 
between operations and other constraints, such as existing airports; the information 
that it provided conveyed whether an operation was accepted into the system and if it 
was rejected, why it was rejected.  
 
In TCL 2, the technical capabilities from TCL 1 were carried over and the concept 
was extended to the evaluation of industrial applications of UAS operations over 
sparsely populated areas. It included a mixture of visual line of sight and beyond vis-
ual line of sight operations. TCL 2 included other enhancements such as: alerting for 
airspace intrusion, alerts to contingency management, and segmented flight planning 
that allowed stratification of operational volumes among other things. TCL 3 and 4 
have not been conducted yet. They will build on the capabilities of TCL 1 and 2 to 
include: operations over increasingly populated areas, moderate and then high UAS 
traffic densities, interactions between manned and unmanned operations, as well as 
large-scale contingency management. The reader is encouraged to see Johnson et al. 
[7] and Kopardekar et al. [3] for a more detailed discussion of NASA's concept of 
operation and test plans. The findings reported in this paper will focus on the most 
recent test - TCL 2. 
 
In TCL 2 we advanced the concept by introducing the ability for operators to plan and 
schedule beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) operations. To accomplish BVLOS, a 
number of capabilities had to be in place for the UAS operators. They needed displays 
that provided information about where their aircraft were relative to operational 
boundaries, and other air traffic. This was accomplished either on a few integrated 
displays or across separate displays. The configuration of these displays as part of the 
floor plan for the UAS ground stations influenced the size of the flight crews and their 
roles. In this paper, we describe how our human factors measures varied as a function 
of these ground station configurations, and offer some interpretation on how those 
differences reflected their effectiveness in the field tests. The analysis we presented 
here was informal and intended to be exploratory. In the next section we consider the 
field test configuration and the UTM architecture before discussing the ground control 
stations and the human factors measures used to evaluate them. 
2 Test Range and Scenarios 
TCL 2 flight tests were bound to uncontrolled airspace 2 miles north of the active 
runway at Reno-Stead Airport (RTS). The range was a flat, dry, desert basin sur-
rounded by steep mountains. UAS flight crews were positioned between 4 of 5 total 
ground control station (GCS) locations in the area (Figure 1); simulated aircraft were 
injected into the test from GCS 1 when the test scenarios required it. The flight test 
director (FTD) coordinated flights on the field, and was located immediately east of 
GCS 3 on the south end of the test range. 
 
Fig. 1. UAS test range north of Reno-Stead Airport. Three-dimensional extrusions 
above the map represent operational boundaries for each of the ground control sta-
tions. 
 
Four different scenarios, each with a different back story, prompting different combi-
nations of events, were performed. Scenarios shared at least one event (Table 1) and 
were designed to represent interactions likely to occur if UTM was to be implemented 
in the future. These interactions included those that involved intruder aircraft and 
contingency management operations. Scenarios were 30 minutes long with up to 5 
concurrent flights over the test range. Actual flight durations were between 6 and 23 
minutes. The flights took place over the course of 5 days, and daily between 8:30 am 
to 12:30 pm to take advantage of favorable weather and wind conditions.   
Table 1. Flight Test Scenarios 
 Scenario 1 
Agriculture 
Scenario 2 
Lost Hiker 
Scenario 3 
Ocean 
Scenario 4 
Earthquake 
BVLOS X X X X 
Multiple BVLOS X  X  
Altitude Stratified 
VLOS 
X X  X 
Altitude Stratified 
BVLOS 
  X  
Intruder Aircraft 
Tracking 
X  X  
Intruder Aircraft 
Conflict Alert 
X  X  
Rogue Aircraft 
Conflict Alerts 
X    
Dynamic Re-
routing 
 X  X 
Contingency 
Management 
Alerts 
  X X 
Public Safety 
Operation 
 X   
Simulated Aircraft  X  X 
FTD 
3 Flight Crew Roles and Responsibilities 
A total of eleven flight crews participated over the duration of the TCL 2 flight tests. 
Two of those were NASA crews. The remaining 9 came from different industry part-
ners. Crew-members were composed of individuals who operated together regularly. 
The size of regular crews varied between 2 and 5 members, where the most common 
crew size was four. Larger size crews of 5 were able to assign just one role to each 
member. Individuals in smaller crews served more than one role. The available roles 
were; pilot-in-control (PIC), client operator, ground control station operator (GCSO), 
on-site software engineer, and launch technician (Table 2). On-site software engineers 
were not required, but were present in some flight crews. Launch technicians were a 
practical requirement of the type of aircraft platform, i.e., fixed-wing aircraft. Auxilia-
ry members expanded the regular crew to provide support specific to the TCL 2 flight 
test, but on occasion assist in pre-flight and post-flight procedures. These roles were; 
UTM representative, visual observer, observer controller, and human factors observer. 
Table 1 shows how the aforementioned roles were distributed across crew members.  
Table 2. An exhaustive list of TCL 2 flight crew roles. 
Regular roles Auxiliary roles 
a) Pilot-in-control (PIC) 
b) Client operator 
c) Ground control station operator 
(GCSO) 
d) On-site software engineer 
e) Launch technician 
f) UTM representative 
g) Visual observer 
h) Observer controller 
i) Human factors observer 
Table 3. Distribution of roles across flight crews. 
 FC1 FC2 FC3 FC4 FC5 FC6 FC7 FC8 FC9 FC10 FC11 
1 a ac a a a a abc a a a ac 
2 b e c b c c c bc bc bcd b 
3 h bf bf c bd bf f g f e f 
4 i h g f f d g d d f e 
5  i h h h h h h d g e 
6   i i i i i i h h d 
7         i i h 
8           i 
*Columns headers are for flight crew. Rows represent individual members. The letters within 
cells are assigned roles as defined in Table 2. Some members supported more than one role. 
 
The PIC was responsible for the operation of the aircraft, and had ultimate authority 
over the operation of the aircraft. For two flight crews, the PIC doubled as a GCSO, 
where the aircraft flew autonomously on a pre-defined flight plan. The client operator 
created, and interfaced with the UTM system to submit flight geometries, as well as 
send and receive notifications. Examples of the geometries submitted by client opera-
tors are illustrated in Figure 1 as 3-dimensional extrusions above the map. The 
GCSOs coordinated with the PIC to run pre-flight and post-flight checklists; they 
generated the flight plans and monitored the aircraft from their GCS display during 
the operations. In some cases, on-site software engineers also served as GCSOs and 
client operators on top of providing expertise in the troubleshooting and tweaking of 
proprietary clients. Launch technicians assembled and directed aircraft launch hard-
ware for catapult fixed-wing platforms, and assisted with retrieval of aircraft upon 
their return and landing.  
 
When a flight crew did not have a client operator, UTM representatives, assigned to 
each flight crew, submitted missions using a client provided by NASA. UTM repre-
sentatives doubled as client operators by relaying UTM system information to the 
flight crew; their permanent role was to coordinate with the flight test group for ad-
herence to research protocols. The visual observer visually tracked the aircraft to as-
sist with separation between other aircraft, fauna, and terrain. The observer controller 
maintained radio contact with the test site authorities and the flight test director to 
coordinate and acquire authorization for take-off at their specific location. In most 
cases human factors observers watched passively and interacted with the flight crew 
for data collection purposes, but in a few instances they also provided assistance to 
the flight crew for miscellaneous tasks, such as equipment setup and packing. 
4 Ground Control Station Configurations 
The crews operated a mixture of fixed-wing and rotor-wing UAVs. Aircraft flew au-
tonomously on routes defined through a mission planner or manually by the pilot-in-
control. UAS ground stations interacted with the UTM system via a client. All of the 
clients deployed by the flight crews were in their early development states. At mini-
mum, the clients were required to be able to submit a flight volume to the UTM sys-
tem and then receive and display messages from the system. If a flight crew did not 
have their own client, a NASA client was issued to them along with a UTM repre-
sentative who submitted volumes on their behalf, as well as verbally relayed the mes-
sages. Mission volumes (Figure 1) were sometimes submitted separately in the client 
and then redrawn on a moving map display to monitor their aircraft conformance to 
the boundaries. For some flight crews this was done by a single individual on a single 
display or by two individuals across multiple displays.  
 
For flight crews where a single individual managed both the client and the ground 
control station, interacting with the UTM system through the client became an inte-
grated part of their pre-flight and post-flight procedures. Interactions with UTM sys-
tem provided GCSOs with information about the success or failure of their volume 
submission; if the volume was rejected, they had access to notifications that explained 
why, and were able to make adjustments to their missions accordingly. When the 
client operator and GCSO roles were assigned to separate individuals, volume sub-
missions and mission planning were not integrated and additional effort had to be 
made to coordinate the operations between the two. For example, a client operator 
may need to wait for available gaps in the existing GCSO regular procedures to deliv-
er important UTM system notifications, which resulted in some take-off delays. It is 
based on this notion of integration between the client operations and GCSO that we 
applied a post hoc grouping of the ground control station configurations. A flight crew 
operated an integrated ground control station if a single individual occupied both the 
client operator and ground control station roles. In Table 1, these were flight crews 
with the letters "b" and "c" located within the same cell - flight crews FC7 to FC10. 
All other flight crews carried non-integrated ground control stations. We conducted 
our analysis according to this classification.  
5 Procedure 
Each flight crew attended the flight test for three days.  The first day consisted of a 
briefing and time for the crews to set up and test their equipment.  The second two 
days were flight days when the crews flew warm-up flights and then a selection of the 
four scenarios that are described above. The warm-up flights served to verify connec-
tivity between the aircraft and the ground station, and the client to the UTM system. 
Generally, crews flew two warm-up flights and two scenarios per flight day.   
 
As part of the flight tests, a five-person human factors team collected data from the 
participants about their experiences flying in one location with multiple partners. 
They collected qualitative data from each group in the flight test as one researcher 
observed each crew. Data were collected in a number of ways, through observations 
of the participants during flights, brief questionnaires at the end of each scenario, and 
end of day group interviews. All these methods focused on five specific topics:  flight 
crew workload during different phases of the flight, flight crew situation awareness, 
flight crew interaction, usage of the UTM clients and usability of the UTM system 
information. Participants were asked to rate their workload and situation awareness 
after each flight on a rating scale from 1 to 7 (very low to very high).   Time permit-
ting, they were also asked to discuss the flight they had just made. End of day inter-
views were focus group sessions, where flight crews discussed topics related to UTM. 
UTM reps also took part in a separate session and discussed the same topics. We fo-
cus our paper on the results generated from the subjective ratings collected for work-
load, situation awareness, flight crew communication, and how well flight crews 
thought the overall procedures, including the client operations, were integrated with 
those associated with the operation of the GCS. Analysis of the remaining human 
factors data are still underway and will be reported in a separate paper.  
 
The 7 point Likert format rating scales were administered to GCSOs and PICs be-
tween each run. A run was defined by the start and stop of single test scenario; this 
was announced by the flight test director. Across 5 days, these ratings were collected 
for a total of 69 runs. These runs were not distributed evenly across flight crews due 
to schedule availability, unforeseen circumstances that made it unsafe to fly, or 
equipment failure. The distribution of runs is shown in Figure 2. Between integrated 
and non-integrated ground control configurations there were 26 and 43 runs respec-
tively. Unfortunately, although interview and observation data was acquired for Flight 
Crew 4 (FC4), we were unable to acquire workload ratings for various reasons; con-
sequently, the results reported here do not include input from them. Overall, the col-
lection of ratings from the flight crews was inconsistent at best-so the total of number 
of ratings do not correspond to the number of runs.  
 
Due the safety risks associated with interacting with flight crews during live flight 
tests, human factors observers were instructed to administer data collection instru-
ments only when safe to do so and at the discretion of the flight crews. In some in-
stances, human factors observers were not able to collected data. The analysis we 
conduct here is informal. The results we present in this paper serve only to assist with 
organizing and describing various flight crew configurations for informing future 
studies, and to highlight some potential display design challenges. We reserve formal 
investigations for future in-lab simulations where experimental control can be exer-
cised. 
 
Fig.  2. Distribution of flights across flight crew. 
6 Results 
Sixteen workload ratings were collected for integrated GCSs versus 24 for non-
integrated GCSs.  Figure 3 shows that mean rated workload between the two crew-
types was equally moderate. Average rated workload for integrated GCSs was 3.9 
(        and 3.6 for non-integrated (       .  
 
Fig.  3. Average workload rating by GCS configurations. 
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Overall quality of communication was reported to be very good for integrated and 
non-integrated GCSs (Figure 4), where the mean for integrated crews was 6.7 
(        and 6.6 for non-integrated (     . Lack of availability for ratings from 
the flight crew and hardware failure resulted in some missing data here. There was 
one missing data point for the integrated group (    ) and 7 missing data points 
for the non-integrated group (    ). 
 
Fig.  4. Average communication rating by GCS configuration. 
 
Consistent with overall quality of communication, on average the GCSOs indicated 
that there was little difficulty in relaying UTM information to the rest of the flight 
crew (Figure 5). This was the same for both integrated (            ) and non-
integrated (            ). Again, lack of availability for ratings resulted in 
missing data with the integrated group (    ) and software issues inhibiting launch 
in the non-integrated group reduced the number of ratings significantly (     ).   
 
Fig. 5. Average difficulty of communication rating by GCS configuration. 
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We see the greatest differences between integrated and non-integrated crews with 
situation awareness (Figure 6). In the integrated group GCSOs felt that their situation 
awareness was good (            ). In contrast, GCSOs in the non-integrated 
group believed their situation awareness was mediocre (            ). Fourteen 
ratings were acquired for integrated versus 18 for non-integrated crews. It is conceiv-
able here, that with integrated displays, it was easier to maintain situation awareness 
because GCSOs did not need to divert attention from their map displays to view UTM 
system notifications. 
 
Fig.  6. Average situation awareness by GCS configuration. 
 
Figure 7 shows ratings for how well GCSOs believed overall procedures were inte-
grated with procedures for the ground station. The average rating for this dimension in 
the integrated group is 6.2 (      ) and 5.4 (      ) for the non-integrated 
group. The difference here is not surprising. If a single operator was considering in-
formation from both the client and ground control station, it is reasonable that proce-
dures for both the displays fall in line with a single set of procedures - even if the 
client and ground control were on separate, but proximal displays. Some additional 
reconciling of procedures would be expected if the client and ground control station 
operations were handled between two separate individuals. For this set of ratings we 
had 15 ratings for integrated and 18 for non-integrated crews. 
 
 
Fig.  7. Average rated integration of procedures by GCS configuration. 
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7 Conclusion 
In this paper we offered a brief introduction to the UTM project and activities associ-
ated with the development of the UTM concept. In our results, we expressed that due 
to limitations in data collection opportunities and the unpredictable circumstances of a 
live flight test environment a considerable amount of data was missing from our ex-
plorative analysis of the UTM GCS configurations. However, TCL 2 offered an op-
portunity to make human factors contributions to the UTM development effort. We 
were able to field and evaluate early versions of the UTM ground control stations, as 
well as vet equally early versions of our data collection instruments and procedures. 
Collectively the data will inform human factors efforts in future UTM tests.  
 
Overall, the subjective ratings revealed that with respect to workload and communica-
tion, there was little to no difference between the integrated and non-integrate GCS 
configurations. GCSOs felt workload was moderate in most circumstances. For com-
munication, we speculate from field observations that when client and GCSO roles 
were not integrated, UTM representatives were able to compensate for any issues that 
germinated from that lack of integration. Although the UTM representatives were an 
artifact of the flight test and did not operate regularly with the flight crew, the flight 
crews regarded them as essential members of the team. In almost all cases, because 
they had an established rapport with the UTM representatives, flight crews requested 
that the representatives initially assigned to them in shakedowns remain with them 
throughout the field tests. As we consider development of the displays and applica-
tions for UTM, it may be useful here to more closely evaluate the role of the UTM 
representative and how aspects of this role can be incorporated into automation used 
to assist interaction with the UTM system. It may also be useful when the concept is 
extended in later TCLs when evaluating the role of operators who will control an 
entire commercial fleet - where the economy of employing a single operator will be 
pertinent and issues such as task switching will be a key concern. 
 
Ratings collected for situation awareness and integration of procedures seem to favor 
integrating the displays and roles for client operator and GCSO. This seems reasona-
ble for commercial applications mentioned above, and for recreational activities 
where it would be economically impractical to require a multi-person crew to operate 
an aircraft. The principle challenge will be to identify what information the UTM 
system can provide for such displays without cluttering or intruding on central mis-
sion planning features. As the development of the UTM system moves forward, the 
human factors effort will need to pay particular attention to assembling information 
requirements that will be sensitive to the privacy concerns of people and industry, but 
at the same time facilitate the sharing of an appropriate amount information to support 
safe and effective use of the UTM airspace. 
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